

## Exhibit 19

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

FAC No. SDG-392566  
[REDACTED]

Date: February 6, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR ADAM J. SZUBIN  
DIRECTOR  
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

FROM: Howard Mendelsohn *HM 2/6/08*  
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis

SUBJECT: (U) Redesignation of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation locations in the United States (**AHF-OREGON**), and AHF official **Soliman AL-BUTHE** pursuant to E.O. 13224

(U) INTRODUCTION

(U) President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 (E.O.) on September 23, 2001 declaring a national emergency to address grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon. The E.O. authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security,<sup>1</sup> and the Attorney General, to designate those persons determined to be:

- (1) owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of those persons listed in the Annex to the E.O., or those determined to be subject to subsection 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d)(i) of the E.O.;
- (2) assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed in the Annex to E.O. 13224 or determined to be subject to the E.O.; or
- (3) associated with those persons listed in the Annex, or those persons determined to be subject to subsection 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d)(i) of the E.O.

(U) The following evidence in the files of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) provides reason to believe that the entity and individual named below satisfy the criteria for designation pursuant to Executive Order 13224, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism."

(U) [Note: The name of the individual and entity proposed for redesignation in this memorandum will appear throughout the following text in **BOLD CAPITAL** font, while the names of persons previously designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 will appear in **Bold Title** font.]

[REDACTED]  
Derived from: Multiple Sources

Declassify on: [REDACTED]

<sup>1</sup> (U) E.O. 13224 was amended by E.O. 13284 (January 23, 2003) adding the Secretary of Homeland Security to the consultative process.

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for Case # 07-cv-1155-KI  
U.S. District Court for the  
District of Oregon May 3/3/08

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(U) ENTITY

(U) **AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION** United States locations:

(U) 1257 Siskiyou Blvd.  
Ashland, OR 97520

(U) 3800 Highway 99 S, Ashland, OR 97520-8718  
[Source: Exhibit 88]

(U) 2151 E Division St.,  
Springfield, MO 65803  
[Source: Exhibit 87; United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for Search Warrant, Exhibit 95]<sup>2</sup>

(U) INDIVIDUAL

(U) **Soliman AL-BUTHE**

(U) a.k.a. **Soliman AL-BATAHAI** a.k.a. **Soliman Al-BATHI** [REDACTED]

(U) DOB: 12/8/1961

(U) POB: Egypt

(U) Nationality: Saudi Arabia

<sup>2</sup> (S) [REDACTED] Additional Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation locations are identified below.

(U//FOUO) P.O. Box 69606  
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 11557

[Source: [www.ariyadh.com](http://www.ariyadh.com), accessed on 12/23/2003, Exhibit 52]

Translation of pertinent parts, Exhibit 50;  
12/23/2003, Exhibit 52; [REDACTED]

[Source: AHF 2000 Annual Report in Arabic,  
[www.ariyadh.com](http://www.ariyadh.com), accessed on [REDACTED]

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(U) Saudi Arabia Passport #: B049614

(U) Saudi Arabia Passport #: C536660

[Source: [www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/consolidatedlist.pdf](http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/consolidatedlist.pdf), Exhibit 192](U) BACKGROUND ON AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION(U) OVERVIEW

(U) Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a prime target of the United States' efforts to thwart the funding of terrorists has been the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHF), a charity widely believed to be corrupted by Al Qaida and to provide support to other terrorists and terrorist activity. See The 9/11 Comm'n Report: Final Report of the National Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, at 170 (citing "the Saudi-based al Haramain Islamic Foundation" as an example of a "corrupt" charity infiltrated by Al Qaida).

(U) In the U.S. Government's overall efforts to combat terrorist abuse of charities, AHF loomed as a major concern. As noted in a June 2004 Treasury press release announcing AHF-related designations, "When viewed as a single entity, [AHF] is one of the principal Islamic NGOs providing support for the Al Qaida network and promoting militant Islamic doctrine worldwide.... Terrorist organizations designated by the U.S. including Jemmah Islammiya, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS and Lashkar E-Taibah received funding from [AHF] and used [AHF] as a front for fundraising and operational activities." [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, June 2, 2004, Exhibit 137]

(U) [REDACTED] A few instances of AHF's global support for, and ties to, terrorist organizations illustrate the grounds for the U.S. Government's serious concern:<sup>3</sup>

- As early as 1997, U.S. and other authorities were informed that AHF-Kenya was involved in plotting terrorist attacks against Americans. As a result, a number of individuals connected to AHF-Kenya were arrested and later deported by Kenyan authorities. In August 1997, an AHF-Kenya employee indicated that the planned attack against the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi would be a suicide bombing carried out by crashing a vehicle into the gate at the Embassy. A wealthy AHF official outside East Africa agreed to provide the necessary funds. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, January 22, 2004, Exhibit 99; [REDACTED]]
- A former AHF-Tanzania Director, believed to be associated with Usama bin Ladin, was responsible for making preparations for the advance party that planned the August 7, 1998, bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, which together killed 224 people. Shortly before the bombing attacks, a former AHF-Tanzania official met with another conspirator to the attacks and cautioned the individual against disclosing knowledge of preparations for the attacks. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, January 22, 2004, Exhibit 99; [REDACTED]]

<sup>3</sup> (U) The press releases cited above were issued on occasion of the designation, pursuant to E.O. 13224, of various AHF branches around the world. The press releases set forth declassified summaries of some of the evidence supporting those designations. The underlying evidence itself is contained in OFAC's files, in the administrative records for those designations.

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- A senior AHF official deployed a Bangladeshi national to conduct surveillance on U.S. consulates in India for potential terrorist attacks. The Bangladeshi national was arrested in early 1999 in India, reportedly carrying four pounds of explosives and five detonators. The terrorist suspect told police that he intended to attack U.S. diplomatic missions in India. The suspect reportedly confessed to training in Al Qaida terrorist camps in Afghanistan, where he met personally with Usama bin Ladin in 1994. The suspect first heard of plans for these attacks at the AHF office in Bangladesh. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, June 2, 2004, Exhibit 137; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MK, co-founded and financed by Usama bin Ladin (UBL), is an SDGT pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224 and the pre-cursor organization of Al Qaida. [Source: United States of America - against- Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayad, Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, Exhibit 70] [REDACTED]

- Using a variety of means, AHF has provided financial support to Al Qaida operatives in Indonesia and to its Southeast Asia affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). According to a senior Al Qaida official apprehended in Southeast Asia, Omar al-Faruq, AHF was one of the primary sources of funding for Al Qaida network activities in the region. JI has committed a series of terrorist attacks, including the bombing of a nightclub in Bali on October 12, 2002 that killed 202 and wounded over 300. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, January 22, 2004, Exhibit 99]

[REDACTED] The United States sought to impede AHF's funding of terrorist groups through both diplomacy, particularly through joint action with Saudi Arabia [Source: Federal News Service, June 2, 2004, Exhibit 135], and through direct regulatory action, i.e. by designating officials and branches of the organization pursuant to E.O. 13224. [REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED] On March 11, 2002, the United States and Saudi Arabia took coordinated blocking actions against the Al Qaida-affiliated AHF offices in Bosnia and Somalia. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, March 11, 2002, Exhibit 24]<sup>4</sup> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on January 22, 2004, Saudi Arabia joined with the United States and designated additional AHF offices in Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Pakistan.<sup>5</sup> These actions were based on evidence that AHF provided support to Specially Designated Global Terrorist organizations including Al Qaida, Jemaah Islamiyah, Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI) and others. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, January 22, 2004, Exhibit 99]

(S) [REDACTED] Continuing coordinated efforts, on June 2, 2004, the United States and Saudi Arabia designated additional AHF offices in Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and The Netherlands.<sup>6</sup> The U.S. also designated AHF's founder and long-time leader, Aqeel Abdulaziz Al-Aqil. These actions were based on evidence that Al-Aqil and AHF provided support to Specially Designated Global Terrorist organizations including Al Qaida, AIAI and others. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, June 2, 2004, Exhibit 137] [REDACTED]

(U) Finally, on September 9, 2004, after consultation with the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the Attorney General, OFAC designated AHF-OREGON as an SDGT. In the same action, OFAC designated AHF-OREGON Director Soliman AL-BUTHE (AL-BUTHE) and the AHF branch in the Comoros Islands (AHF-Comoros Islands). [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury Press Release, September 9, 2004, Exhibit 221]

<sup>4</sup> (U) The United States designated the Bosnia and Somalia offices pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224.

<sup>5</sup> (U) The designations were made pursuant to E.O. 13224.

<sup>6</sup> (U) The designations were made pursuant to E.O. 13224.

<sup>7</sup> (U) These reported actions comport with official stated Saudi policy regarding Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). On June 2, 2004, the Adviser to Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah stated that existing entities, including AHF, would be dissolved or have their assets folded into the Saudi National Entity for Charitable Work Abroad. The Adviser explained that the Saudi National Entity for Charitable Work Abroad would be the sole vehicle through which all private Saudi donations will go to help those in need. According to the Saudi advisor, the purpose of this effort was to put in place new regulations and financial control mechanisms to ensure that people "don't take advantage of our financial system or of our charities." [Source: Federal News Service, June 2, 2004, Exhibit 135]

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(U) AHF AS A GLOBAL ENTERPRISE

(S) [REDACTED]

Yet according to a Saudi news report, Al-Aqil reportedly stated, "I resigned willingly. I wanted to give new blood a chance to assume the responsibilities, since I have personal business that I need to attend to. I have not left the organization, I have just resigned as General Manager, I will stay on as an active member and as an advisor," [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Al-Aqil had reportedly been the head of AHF for many years and was one of AHF's founders, [REDACTED] [Source: RIYADH 000164, Exhibit 72; See also, FBIS, London Al-Hayah in Arabic, January 8, 2004, Exhibit 104]

(S) [REDACTED] Among the reasons for Al-Aqil's removal was his "absolute centralization" of AHF, according to a Saudi news report. [Source: FBIS, London Al-Hayah in Arabic, January 8, 2004, Exhibit 104] Mansour Al-Kadi, [REDACTED] cited Al-Aqil's "autocratic and centralist governance" of AHF as the main reason for his resignation, according to an Arabic language posting on an Internet forum. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Internet posting identifies Al-Aqil as the "only individual with final decision making on

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AHF-OREGON Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39; [REDACTED]

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spending...and the one with the authority to hire employees, even if it is just a janitor." [Source: <http://alsaha.fares.net/>, Exhibit 106]

(U) Al-Aqil himself responded to an Arab news outlet question regarding the extent to which AHF maintains "tight control over the affiliated offices" by stating: "Yes, of course. The offices' directors are employees who follow the directions of the main office with regards to hiring workers at the offices and making any decisions on cooperation with any party. In the main office, there are 19 auditors. Each of the foundation's specialized committees has an auditor. There are monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports on the foundation's revenue and expenditure." [Source: Open Source Center, London Al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 16, 2002, Exhibit 153]

(U) As set forth below, the AHF headquarters, under Al-Aqil's leadership, provided funding and instructions that governed the activities of AHF throughout the world including in Bosnia, Albania, Iraq, the United States, and elsewhere.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>12</sup> (U) AHF-Bosnia was designated on March 11, 2002 pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, March 11, 2002, Exhibit 24]

<sup>13</sup> (U) Subsequent to its designation, AHF-Bosnia reopened under the name Vazir. On December 22, 2003, Vazir was designated pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. to request that the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee also list Vazir. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, December 22, 2003, Exhibit 98]

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(S) [REDACTED]

As of March 2004, Al-Aqil, and his deputy Mansour Al-Kadi, were identified as board members of AHF-The Netherlands, according to diplomatic reporting. [Source: THE HAGUE 000771, Exhibit 108]

(U) ADDITIONAL AHF-RELATED INFORMATION

<sup>14</sup> (U) On June 2, 2004, the Adviser to Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah stated that existing entities, including AHF, will be dissolved or have their assets folded into the Saudi National Entity for Charitable Work Abroad. The Adviser explained that the Saudi National Entity for Charitable Work Abroad will be the sole vehicle through which all private Saudi donations will go to help those in need. According to the Saudi Adviser, the purpose of this effort is to put in place new regulations and financial control mechanisms to ensure that people "don't take advantage of our financial system or of our charities." [Source: Federal News Service, June 2, 2004, Exhibit 135]

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(U) ACTIONS OF CERTAIN AHF BRANCHES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(U) ALBANIA

(S) [REDACTED]

In 1998, the head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in Albania was reportedly also the "accountant" for AHF-Albania, according to a French news report. [Source: FBIS, Paris Le Figaro in French, September 30, 1998, Exhibit 91] This individual, Ahmed Ibrahim al-Nagar, was reportedly extradited from Albania to Egypt in 1998. At his trial in Egypt, al-Nagar reportedly voiced his support for UBL and Al Qaida's terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, according to Agence France Presse. [Source: Agence France Presse, February 1, 1999, Exhibit 93]

(S) [REDACTED]

Institute for War and Peace  
Reporting, January 31, 2003, Exhibit 101]

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[REDACTED]

(U) KOSOVO

[REDACTED]

(U) IRAQ

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>16</sup> (U) The National Liberation Army is designated pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13304.

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(U) SOMALIA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) UNITED STATES (AHF-OREGON)

(U) On the U.S. AHF-OREGON's tax form 990 for 2001 filed with the IRS, Al-Aqil is identified as the President, Al-Kadi as the Vice President, AL-BUTHE as the Treasurer, and Perouz Seda Ghaty (Seda) as the Secretary. [Source: AHF-OREGON Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39] The AHF-OREGON branch's Articles of Incorporation and application to the IRS for tax-exempt status also list Al-Aqil, Al-Kadi, Seda, and AL-BUTHE as members of the board of directors. [United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for search Warrant, Exhibit 95] Seda also is identified as the registered agent for

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AHF-OREGON and as a member of the board of directors of AHF-OREGON, according to an Affidavit filed in federal court in the U.S. [United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for search Warrant, Exhibit 95] AHF-OREGON appeared to first establish its presence in the U.S. when Seda and AL-BUTHE registered the organization with the Oregon Secretary of State as an assumed business name in October 1997. [United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for search Warrant, Exhibit 95]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] During April 1999, Seda allegedly announced during a prayer session that he was outraged at atrocities in Kosovo carried out by the Serbian military against Muslims. Seda reportedly announced during the same session that he knew of mujahideen willing to travel to the region to fight Serbs, and then reportedly began to solicit funds for the same. [Source: U.S. v. Perouz Sedaghaty aka Pete Seda, [No. CR 05-60008-01], the Government Memorandum in Support of Pretrial Detention, (Pretrial Detention Request) August 21, 2007, and accompanying exhibits A-P, Exhibit 156] That same month, Seda wired \$2,000 to the AHF office in Albania. [Source: Pretrial Detention Request exhibit K, Exhibit 212] The AHF-Albania office was the closest AHF office to the fighting in Kosovo.<sup>17</sup> [Source: Pretrial Detention Request, Exhibit 156]<sup>18</sup>

[REDACTED]

(TS) [REDACTED] In late 2001, Seda, a senior AHF official in the U.S., sought a license from OFAC to purportedly assist Afghan refugees in border camps in Iran on the Iranian/Afghanistan border. [Source: Correspondence from Perouz Seda Ghaty to the OFAC Licensing Division, November 1, 2001, Exhibit 37] As part of Seda's request to OFAC in November 2001,<sup>19</sup> he reported that Shaykh Al-Aqil, identified as the President of AHF, agreed to Seda's proposal to fund \$500,000 for assistance to Afghan refugees in border camps in Iran.

[REDACTED]

<sup>17</sup> (U) As noted elsewhere in this memorandum, the AHF-Albania branch was designated as an SDGT on June 2, 2004. See, Exhibit 137.

<sup>19</sup> (U) [Source: Correspondence from Perouz Seda Ghaty to the OFAC Licensing Division, November 1, 2001, Exhibit 37]

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(U) As of March 2003 **Al-Aqil** and **Al-Kadi** reportedly resigned from the **AHF-OREGON** office. [Source: Correspondence from Bernabei & Katz, PLLC to OFAC, August 4, 2004, (AHF Counsel Exhibits 1 and 2), Exhibit 151]

(U) On February 18, 2004, Federal law enforcement authorities executed a search warrant against property purchased on behalf of AHF in Ashland, Oregon. The search was conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation into possible violations of the Internal Revenue Code, the Money Laundering Control Act and the Bank Secrecy Act. In a separate administrative action, OFAC blocked pending investigation AHF accounts and real property in the U.S. to ensure the preservation of AHF assets pending further investigation. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, February 19, 2004, Exhibit 94; United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for search Warrant, Exhibit 95]

#### (U) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

(U) In support of the request for reconsideration of the designation of **AL-BUTHE**, **AL-BUTHE** counsel informed OFAC via correspondence that **AL-BUTHE** learned during March 2000 "while en route to the United States" that a Dr. Mahmoud El-Fiki "had contributed \$150,000 to [AHF-OREGON], designating it for Chechen relief efforts." [Source: Correspondence from **AL-BUTHE** attorney Thomas Nelson to OFAC, January 19, 2005, Exhibit 154] As indicated in Exhibit 95 (the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for Search Warrant), documents referenced in the exhibit include the February 21, 2000 letter from **Al-Aqil** to Fiki in which **Al-Aqil** himself thanked Fiki for his "generous donation of \$150,000." [Source: United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for Search Warrant, Exhibit 95]

(U) In March 2000, **AL-BUTHE** and **AHF-OREGON** official Seda were involved with withdrawing the \$150,000 Fiki contribution from the **AHF-OREGON** branch bank account, after which **AL-BUTHE** transported the funds in travelers' checks and a cashier's check from the United States to Saudi Arabia. The indictment of **AL-BUTHE**, Seda and **AHF-OREGON** indicates the following in regards to Fiki's donation: "Intending that the funds be delivered to the Chechen mujahideen, defendants Pirouz Sedagaty [Seda], Soliman [AL-BUTHE], the [AHF-OREGON], and others, engaged in a conspiracy to prevent the United States Government from learning of the transaction by failing to fill out paperwork, as required by law, acknowledging the funds were leaving the United States, and by filing a false tax return with the Internal Revenue Service which falsified how the donated funds were distributed by defendant [AHF-OREGON]." [Source: Copy of Indictment in U.S. v. AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION, INC.; Pirouz SEDAGHATY, a/k/a Pete Seda, Perouz Seda Ghaty and Abu Yunus; and Soliman Hamd AL-BUTHE, Exhibit 165]

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<sup>20</sup> (U) The Russian Federal Security Service, which was reported to have been monitoring AHF activities since 1999, identified a bank account through which some \$1 million reportedly was sent for weapons and terrorists, and determined that Mansur Bin Abd al-Rakhman Al-Kadi sent 480,000 Saudi Rials through AHF channels to Chechen separatists. [Source: Open Source Center, Milan Panorama, November 27, 2003, Exhibit 199]

(U)

The 479,514 Saudi Rial receipt reportedly accounts for part of the Fiki-donated \$150,000 donated by Fiki and carried by AL-BUTHE from Oregon to Saudi Arabia. [Source: Exhibit L of the Pretrial Detention Request, Exhibit 210; and correspondence from AHF attorney Lynne Bernabei to OFAC, February 14, 2005, with attachments, Exhibit 200]

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Khattab and Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev together led the Islamic International Brigade. Basayev's forces led the August 1999 incursion into Daghestan which by late September 1999 helped precipitate the second Chechen war. [Source: "Terrorist Designation Under Executive Order 13224 Islamic International Brigade, Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, and Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs," U.S. Department of State, February 28, 2003; and Appendix C of the 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, U.S. Department of State, collectively Exhibit 158; Washington Post, March 20, 2000, Exhibit 219]

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[REDACTED] as indicated by the United States Department of State during February 2003, Khattab and Shamil Basayev together headed the **Islamic International Brigade (IIB)**. The IIB was one of three Al-Qaida-linked and Chechnya-based terrorist organizations designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists on February 14, 2003 for involvement in the Dubrovka Theater seizure in Moscow during October 2002. Some 129 persons were killed in the attack, including one U.S. citizen.<sup>23</sup> [Source: "Terrorist Designation Under Executive Order 13224 **Islamic International Brigade, Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, and Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs**," U.S. Department of State, February 28, 2003; and Appendix C of the 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, U.S. Department of State, collectively Exhibit 158]

(U) Documents and other materials (e.g. the aforementioned videos) relating to Chechnya and Chechen mujahideen were obtained by law enforcement officials from **AHF-OREGON** and/or from **AHF-OREGON** office computers in late 2003/early 2004. Among photographs seized in February 2004 was one of Islamic Army of the Caucasus (IAC) Commander in Chief **Shamil Basayev**,<sup>24</sup> together with Ibn Ul Khattab of the IAC-loyal Foreign Mujahideen Brigade, and Khattab's successor (Khattab was killed in March 2002), Abu Al-Walid Al-Ghamidi. [Source: Accompanying exhibit H of the Pretrial Detention Request, Exhibit 211] The Pretrial Detention Request also indicates that videos seized from **AHF-OREGON** depict violent acts committed

<sup>23</sup> (U) The IIB, the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs were together added to the UN 1267 list on March 4, 2003; Shamil Basayev was added to the UN 1267 list on August 12, 2003. [Source: Copy of portions of the 1267 Consolidated List of the United Nations Security Council's Al Qaida And Taliban Sanctions Committee noting the March 4, 2003 addition of the Islamic International Brigade, Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, and the August 12, 2003 addition of Shamil Basayev, Exhibit 218] These groups were submitted for designation to the UN Sanctions Committee by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Spain and Germany – "the first time that the permanent members made such a joint submission on a terrorist designation." [Source: "Eurasia Overview" of the 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, U.S. Department of State, Exhibit 217]

<sup>24</sup> (U) Shamil Basayev was designated as an SDGT on August 8, 2003.

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against Russian soldiers by mujahideen in Chechnya. Among the items found on Seda's computer were photographs of deceased mujahideen and Russian soldiers, passports belonging to deceased Russian soldiers, and a map indicating the location of mujahideen military engagements. [Source: Accompanying exhibit G of the Pretrial Detention Request, Exhibit 157]

(U) COMOROS ISLANDS, ETHIOPIA, and BANGLADESH

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) IRAN

<sup>26</sup> (S) The following sources include additional information on Al Qaida and other activities of concern in the Comoros. [REDACTED] United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., trial transcript, May 2, 2001, Exhibit 140; United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., trial transcript, May 7, 2001, Exhibit 141; United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., trial transcript, May 8, 2001, Exhibit 142]

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(U) SENIOR AHF OFFICIALS

(S) [REDACTED] Information on additional senior AHF officials is set forth below.

(U) Aqeel Abdelaziz Al-Aqil

(S) [REDACTED] The New York Times, September 26, 2003, Exhibit 102] Al-Aqil was designated pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224 on June 2, 2004.

[REDACTED] Al-Aqil also is identified as AHF's President and Chairman.  
[Source: AHF-OREGON Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39; The Sunday Oregonian, November 9, 2003, Exhibit 103; FBIS, London Al-Hayah in Arabic, March 1, 2004, Exhibit 105]

(S) [REDACTED] According to a Saudi news report, Al-Aqil reportedly stated, "I resigned willingly. I wanted to give new blood a chance to assume the responsibilities, since I have personal business that I need to attend to. I have not left the organization, I have just resigned as General Manager, I will stay on as an active member and as an advisor," [REDACTED] Al-Aqil reportedly had been the head of AHF for many years. [Source: RIYADH 000164, Exhibit 72; See also, FBIS, London Al-Hayah in Arabic, January 8, 2004, Exhibit 104]

(S) [REDACTED] Among the reasons for Al-Aqil's removal was his "absolute centralization" of AHF, according to a Saudi news report. [Source: FBIS, London Al-Hayah in Arabic, January 8, 2004,

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Exhibit 104] Mansour Al-Kadi, [REDACTED] cited Al-Aqil's "autocratic and centralist governance" of AHF as the main reason for his resignation, according to an Arabic language posting on an Internet forum. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Internet posting identifies Al-Aqil as the "only individual with final decision making on spending...and the one with the authority to hire employees, even if it is just a janitor." [Source: <http://alsaha.fares.net/>, Exhibit 106]

[REDACTED]

(U) Additional Aqeel Abdelaziz Al-Aqil Information

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

29 (S)

[REDACTED] AHF-OREGON Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U) Mansour bin Abdul Rahman Al-Kadi

RIYADH 001094, Exhibit 47; AHF-OREGON Tax

Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39

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(U) Additional Information on Mansur bin Abdul Rahman Al-Kadi

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] Hisham Al-Mashari

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>26</sup> (U) AHF-Bosnia was designated on March 11, 2002 pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, March 11, 2002, Exhibit 24]

<sup>37</sup> (U) Subsequent to the designation of AHF-Bosnia, it reopened under the name Vazir. On December 22, 2003, Vazir was designated pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. to request that the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee also list Vazir. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, December 22, 2003, Exhibit 98]

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(U) **Soliman AL-BUTHE**

(U) **AL-BUTHE** has been identified as the Treasurer of **AHF-OREGON**, according to the U.S. **AHF-OREGON** tax form 990 for 2001 filed with the IRS. [Source: **AHF-OREGON** Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39] Resident in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, **AL-BUTHE** also reportedly assisted in the establishment of **AHF-OREGON**, and served as the chairman of AHF's U.S. Committee, according to an Affidavit in Support of an Application for Search Warrant and local news reports. [Source: United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for search Warrant, Exhibit 95; The Oregonian, January 10, 2004, Exhibit 121; The Sunday Oregonian, November 9, 2003, Exhibit 103] In a document signed by AHF's leader **Al-Aqil**, AHF in Saudi Arabia appointed **AL-BUTHE** "true and lawful attorney in [AHF's] name, place and stead," apparently giving **AL-BUTHE** broad legal authority to act on AHF's behalf in the U.S. [United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for Search Warrant, Exhibit 95]

(S)

[Source: Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, June 3, 2003, Exhibit 123; [REDACTED] **AL-BUTHE**'s role as a senior AHF official is corroborated in part by information obtained by the FBI. A letter drafted on AHF "head office-Riyadh" stationery identifies **AL-BUTHE** as the President of AHF's Internet Committee. [Source: Copy of Government Exhibit F139a, Exhibit 127]

(U) Other evidence shows that **AL-BUTHE** had signature authority to sign contracts on behalf of AHF's head office in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On or about February 15, 2002, a "Memorandum of Agreement" showed that **AL-BUTHE** represented AHF in an agreement that was signed with a U.S. party for the development and distribution of religious materials. [Source: Government Exhibit F67A, Exhibit 128] In two other related contracts, **AL-BUTHE** also represented AHF in signing agreements. [Source: Copy of Government Exhibit F61A, Exhibit 129; E010(4B36-31-098 to 100), Exhibit 130]

(U) On February 18, 2004, Federal law enforcement authorities executed a search warrant against property purchased on behalf of **AHF-OREGON**. The search was conducted pursuant to

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a criminal investigation into possible violations by **AL-BUTHE** (and Seda) of the Internal Revenue Code, the Money Laundering Control Act and the Bank Secrecy Act. In a separate administrative action, OFAC blocked pending investigation AHF accounts and real property in the U.S. to ensure the preservation of AHF assets pending further investigation. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, February 19, 2004, Exhibit 94; United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for Search Warrant, Exhibit 95]

[REDACTED]

(U) Additional Information on **Soliman AL-BUTHE**

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) **AL-BUTHE** and Seda were involved with the withdrawal of funds from the **AHF-OREGON** branch office bank account during March 2000. The withdrawn funds included a \$150,000 contribution from Dr. Mahmoud Talaat El-Fiki. In a February 20, 2000 email to "haramain" notifying the organization of Fiki's contribution it was indicated that the money was given "as Zakat in order to participate in your noble support to our muslim brothers in Chychnia."<sup>39</sup> Also noted in the email was "our previous correspondence," and the fact that a request was made to Fiki's bank in London "to make a transaction to your USA account, using

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*the details you provided in an earlier email...*" (emphasis added). The money subsequently was transported by AL-BUTHE to Saudi Arabia, at which point it is believed to have been sent to mujahideen in Chechnya. [Source: Pretrial Detention Request, Exhibit 156; Accompanying exhibit L of the Pretrial Detention Request, Exhibit 210]

(U) In support of the request for reconsideration of the designation of AL-BUTHE, AL-BUTHE counsel informed OFAC via correspondence that AL-BUTHE first learned of Fiki's contribution during early March 2000 – this despite the February 20, 2000 Fiki-related email which referenced "previous correspondence" and "details...provided in an earlier email." [Source: Correspondence from AL-BUTHE attorney Thomas Nelson to OFAC, January 19, 2005, Exhibit 154; accompanying exhibit L of the Pretrial Detention Request, Exhibit 210] The attorney correspondence also indicated that "AL-BUTHE is uncertain why Dr. Fiki (whom Mr. AL-BUTHE has never met) sent the contribution to the United States instead of Saudi Arabia," but AL-BUTHE "speculates that there probably are fewer restrictions on [affecting] such transfers into the United States." AL-BUTHE also speculated that Fiki may have responded to "website instructions or advertisements that had been published in Islamic magazines directing contributions to the United States." That speculation, however, appears inconsistent with the aforementioned reference to "previous correspondence" and with the fact that Fiki's contribution to the U.S. bank account was completed "using details...provided in an earlier email." [Source: Correspondence from AL-BUTHE attorney Thomas Nelson to OFAC, January 19, 2005, Exhibit 154; accompanying exhibit L from the Pretrial Detention Request, Exhibit 210]

(TS) [REDACTED] In support of the request for reconsideration of the designation of AL-BUTHE, AL-BUTHE counsel also informed OFAC via correspondence that AL-BUTHE worked on the Saudi-based AHF website as early as 1993, and continued in this work as late as March 2000. Moreover, the letter indicated that the very purpose of AL-BUTHE's trip to the United States during March 2000 was to assist "in establishing an Islamic website, IslamToday."<sup>40</sup> Additionally, it is elaborated in the correspondence that AL-BUTHE's role with the AHF evolved over time to the point at which he became "responsible for internet activities and then for charitable works in the United States."<sup>41</sup> [Source: Correspondence from AL-BUTHE attorney Thomas Nelson to OFAC, January 19, 2005, Exhibit 154] According to the indictment of Seda and AL-BUTHE, the AHF website ([www.alharamain.org](http://www.alharamain.org)), as of 1999 and 2000, contained numerous articles supportive of the Chechen mujahideen, to include reports such as "The Latest News About Jihaad in Chechnya." The website also contained a prayer for Chechen mujahideen, referring to them as the "Mujahideen brothers in Chechnya." The indictment further indicates that a link was provided via the AHF website to [www.qogaz.com](http://www.qogaz.com), through which details could be obtained on how to fund Chechen mujahideen.<sup>42</sup> [Source: Copy

<sup>40</sup> (U) The March 2000 trip referenced here is the same trip during which Fiki's \$150,000 contribution was withdrawn from the AHF-OREGON account and transported by AL-BUTHE from the United States to Saudi Arabia. [Source: Correspondence from AL-BUTHE attorney Thomas Nelson to OFAC, January 19, 2005, Exhibit 154]

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of Indictment in U.S. v. AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION, INC.; Pirouz SEDAGHATY, a/k/a Pete Seda, Perouz Seda Ghaty and Abu Yunus; and Soliman Hamd AL-BUTHE, Exhibit 165] Thus, an argument that AL-BUTHE was ignorant of AHF facilitation (e.g. via qoqaz.com) of funding of the Chechen mujahideen would be questionable given his internet-related responsibilities, his overt acts (transporting the \$150,000 Fiki contribution), his official position with the AHF and its Oregon branch (supportive of Chechen mujahideen). [REDACTED]

[Source:

Correspondence from AL-BUTHE attorney Thomas Nelson to OFAC, January 19, 2005, Exhibit 154; letter presumably from AL-BUTHE identifying him as the President of the "Internet Committee" of AHF-Riyadh, Exhibit 127; copy of Indictment in U.S. v. AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION, INC.; Pirouz SEDAGHATY, a/k/a Pete Seda, Perouz Seda Ghaty and Abu Yunus; and Soliman Hamd AL-BUTHE, Exhibit 165; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Intercepts disclosed during Al-Timimi's trial (Al-Timimi was

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convicted and sentenced to life in prison) reveal a relationship between Al-Timimi and **AL-BUTHE**. **AL-BUTHE** was intercepted in some four conversations with Al-Timimi. In an intercept on February 1, 2003, at 15:38 Al-Timimi spoke with FNU LNU,<sup>46</sup> (subsequently determined to be **Soliman AL-BUTHE**). [Source: Copy of United States of America v. Ali Al-Timimi, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Exhibit 168; Stipulations 17-24, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Exhibit 204] During the conversation, FNU LNU provided Al-Timimi with the following fax number: 966-12066331. During the same intercept, FNU LNU passed the telephone to Ahmad LNU. After a brief conversation, Al-Timimi told Ahmad LNU to ask "Sulayman," (likely **Soliman AL-BUTHE**) to call him (Al-Timimi) the next day so that Al-Timimi could dictate something to "Sulayman." That same day at 16:20 Al-Timimi again was intercepted speaking to FNU LNU (subsequently determined to be **Soliman AL-BUTHE**). [Source: GX 10B4A, Copy of Ali Al-Timimi Telephone Intercept Linesheet, Exhibit 206; Stipulations 17-24, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Exhibit 204] During the conversation FNU LNU provided Al-Timimi with the following U.S. telephone (probable fax) number: 253-981-9150. An internet query links both aforementioned telephone numbers with ICSFP.com and sb@whymuhammad.net. The latter internet addresses, per the Internet search, correspond both to the International Committee for the Support of the Final Prophet (ICSFP) and the Office of the Campaign to Defend the Prophet. The query also indicates that **AL-BUTHE** is the President of the ICSFP. [Source: Internet query printout relating to telephone numbers 966-120066331 and 253-981-9150, Exhibit 207]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>46</sup> (U) GX 10B3A, Copy of Ali Al-Timimi Telephone Intercept Linesheet, Exhibit 205. "FNU LNU" refers to First Name Unknown, Last Name Unknown.

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(U) CONCLUSION

(U) **AL-BUTHE** should be determined to be subject to Executive Order 13224 for the following reason:

- By serving as a senior AHF official, **AL-BUTHE** has acted for or on behalf of, has assisted in, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of **Al Qaida** and other SDGTs.

(U) **AHF-OREGON** should be determined to be subject to Executive Order 13224 for the following reasons:

- **AHF-OREGON** has been owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of **Al-Aqil**.
- **AHF-OREGON** has been owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of **AL-BUTHE**.
- As a branch of the Saudi charity **Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation**, **AHF-OREGON** has acted for or on behalf of, or has assisted in, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of **Al Qaida** and other SDGTs.

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